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Abstract 
Mass atrocity prevention has been controversial, both when members of the international community have taken ac-
tion as well as when they have failed to do so. In 1999, then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan challenged the interna-
tional community to reconcile the need to respect state sovereignty with the need to protect populations from egre-
gious human rights violations. R2P’s emergence offered an opportunity to move past the discourse and practice 
associated with its predecessor—“humanitarian intervention.” However, while R2P has succeeded in changing the dis-
course, it has failed to make a change in practice. A source of this failure is R2P’s “ulterior motive exemption.” Using the 
R2P intervention in Libya as a case study, this article concludes that because ulterior motives existed: (1) NATO’s prima-
ry intent of civilian protection quickly evolved into the intent to overthrow Muammar Qaddafi; (2) in exceeding its 
mandate, NATO committed an act of aggression; (3) NATO continued to militarily support the rebels while they  were 
committing war crimes and severe human rights violations; (4) NATO’s actions resulted in civilian casualties, which 
NATO has refused to investigate; and (5) NATO abdicated its responsibility to protect Libyans from the human suffering 
that continued subsequent to Qaddafi’s execution. 
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1. Introduction 
At the end of a decade that saw varied responses to 
numerous mass atrocities, then UN Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan challenged the international community to 
reconcile the need to preserve state sovereignty rights 
with the human right to be protected from the most 
egregious forms of human rights violations. The Cana-
dian government responded to Annan’s challenge by 
forming the International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty (ICISS). In 2001, ICISS published 
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P).  
Gareth Evans and Ramesh Thakur, R2P’s principal 
authors, have gone to great lengths to separate R2P 
from the “right to intervene” and “humanitarian inter-
vention” discourse that preceded it. According to 
Thakur (2013), R2P is victim- and people-centered; it 
puts the needs of the victims and potential victims 
ahead of the needs of the intervening states, whereas 
humanitarian intervention is deferential to the prefer-
ences and priorities of the intervening states. For Evans 
and Thakur (2013), the shift away from a right of hu-
manitarian intervention to the responsibility to protect 
is exemplified by R2P’s embrace of “a whole spectrum 
of preventive and reactive responses, with coercive 
military action reserved only for those extreme and ex-
ceptional cases” (p. 202). The shift in discourse is fur-
ther buttressed by R2P’s incorporation of its three core 
elements: (1) the responsibility to prevent; (2) the re-
sponsibility to react; and (3) the responsibility to re-
build. Evans and Thakur (2013) argue that if interven-
tions are truly motivated primarily by humanitarian 
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concerns, then the solidarity implied by its implemen-
tation would also be expressed prior and subsequent 
to the military intervention.  
In their concerted efforts to distance R2P from its 
predecessors, Evans and Thakur (2013; Thakur, 2015) 
have demonstrated a preoccupation with celebrating 
the change in discourse ushered in by R2P, while failing 
to objectively evaluate whether the change in dis-
course can effectively change the way states intervene 
for alleged humanitarian purposes in practice. For ex-
ample, in response to a critique authored by Robert 
Pape (2012), Evans and Thakur (2013) argue that Pape 
took the intervention debate “straight back to the 
deeply divisive, problematical, costly (in blood and 
treasure), and utterly ineffectual pre-2001 status quo 
ante” by resurrecting the humanitarian intervention 
discourse (p. 202). Success in changing the discourse is 
far from trivial; it is significant for all the reasons Evans, 
Thakur, and other R2P proponents have cited. Howev-
er, a change in discourse is only as valuable as the 
changes in practice it elicits. Therefore, currently, the 
more important question is whether R2P interventions 
in practice will mirror the change in discourse.  
The 2011 R2P intervention in Libya provides the 
first and only case for analysis. The intervention in Lib-
ya has been hailed a success by the media and politi-
cians (Kuperman, 2013a; O’Connell, 2011), as well as 
R2P’s architects and proponents (Pattison, 2011; 
Thakur, 2011; Thakur, 2013; Weiss, 2011a). However, 
as will be demonstrated through an analysis of the 
NATO-led intervention in Libya, R2P’s “ulterior motive 
exemption” ensures the likelihood that the overall 
change in discourse around intervention for alleged ci-
vilian protection will not be met with a similar change 
in practice. NATO’s ulterior motives had a detrimental 
effect on the intentions behind NATO’s use of force, 
raising significant questions regarding whether the 
presence of ulterior motives and, therefore, multiple 
intentions behind the use of force, can be restrained 
while carrying out an intervention.  
This article begins with a discussion of R2P’s ulterior 
motive exemption. It then analyzes the role ulterior 
motives played in NATO’s actions in Libya. This article 
concludes that because ulterior motives existed: (1) 
NATO’s primary intent of civilian protection quickly 
evolved into the primary intent of overthrowing 
Muammar Qaddafi; (2) in exceeding what was man-
dated by Security Council Resolution 1973, NATO 
committed an act of aggression in violation of the UN 
Charter; (3) NATO continued to militarily support the 
rebels despite the fact that they were committing war 
crimes and egregious human rights violations; (4) 
NATO’s actions resulted in civilian casualties, which 
NATO has refused to investigate; and (5) NATO abdi-
cated its responsibility to protect Libyans from the hu-
man suffering that continued subsequent to Qaddafi’s 
execution. 
2. R2P’s “Ulterior Motive Exemption” 
R2P’s right intention principle states that the “primary 
purpose of the intervention, whatever other motives 
intervening states may have, must be to halt or avert 
human suffering” (ICISS, 2001, p. XII). According to 
ICISS (2001), intervention cannot be justified if, from 
the outset, the intent of the intervening force is to alter 
borders or advance “a particular group’s claim to self-
determination” (p. 35). Further, ICISS (2001) states that 
regime change is not a legitimate objective, though it 
allows that disabling a regime’s ability to harm its own 
people “may be essential to discharging the mandate 
of protection” (p. 35.).  
That R2P permits other motives is referred to as the 
“ulterior motive exemption” because it allows inter-
vening states to have motives other than civilian pro-
tection driving their participation in an intervention. 
ICISS’s inclusion of an ulterior motive exemption in R2P 
is based on the reality of how states operate in interna-
tional affairs. ICISS (2001) notes, “Complete disinter-
estedness—the absence of any narrow self-interest at 
all—may be an ideal, but it is not likely always to be re-
ality: mixed motives, in international relations as eve-
rywhere else, are a fact of life” (p. 36). ICISS (2001) ar-
gues that the variety of costs involved when 
participating in a military intervention, including budg-
etary costs and physical risk to military personnel, 
make it politically necessary for participants in a mili-
tary intervention to have some degree of self-interest 
in the intervention. 
In his defense of the ulterior motive exemption, 
James Pattison (2010) reiterates much of what has al-
ready been presented, while also emphasizing the im-
portance of differentiating between “intentions” and 
“motives.” Pattison argues that intentions and motives 
are often wrongly used interchangeably. The intention 
of the intervening force equates to the purpose behind 
the intervention. For the intention to be humanitarian, 
the purpose of the intervention must be to prevent, 
reduce, or halt the human suffering resulting from the 
humanitarian crisis. The motive, however, is better ex-
plained as the reason behind the intervening force’s in-
volvement in the intervention. According to Pattison 
(2010), conflating intention with motive “leads to the 
conclusion that there can be no such thing as ‘humani-
tarian intervention’ since interveners rarely, if ever, 
possess humanitarian motives” (p. 155).  
Defenders of R2P’s ulterior motive exemption inevi-
tably get trapped in a logical fallacy. In the effort to 
minimize the impact considerations of national interest 
will have on an intervention and to distinguish intent 
from motive, they tend to isolate self-interests from in-
tentions and motives from intent. Defenders seek to 
justify the claim that military intervention for civilian 
protection can be carried out by intervening states that 
hold ulterior motives for their participation without the 
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intervening states acting on the motives that drove 
their participation in the first place. Yet, if intervening 
states are motivated to provide civilian protection 
within a humanitarian crisis by their desire to achieve 
something in their self-interest, what the intervening 
states seeks to achieve must also be part of their in-
tent. In other words, the ulterior motive will ultimately 
impact the purpose behind the intervention, extending 
it beyond achieving civilian protection. If the reason for 
participating in the intervention is motivated by self-
interest then it would follow that the intervening states 
would seek to satisfy their self-interest. Not doing so 
would be logically inconsistent.  
Roland Paris (2014) levies similar criticisms regard-
ing R2P’s ulterior motive exemption, as well as the lack 
of attention paid to how ulterior motives will impact 
interventions in practice. Paris finds defenses of the ul-
terior motive exemption unsatisfactory because “they 
investigate the mixed motives problem as a normative, 
legal and procedural puzzle, but largely overlook the 
impact of mixed motives on the feasibility of preven-
tive humanitarian intervention” (p. 574). Paris (2014) 
also raises the possibility that self-interested acts ema-
nating from intervening states’ ulterior motives could 
result in a backlash against R2P, “particularly if the doc-
trine is viewed as a ‘cover’ for imperialism, pre-emptive 
war, or other ulterior motives” (p. 574). In response to 
Paris, Thakur seems more concerned with Paris’ re-
peated references to “humanitarian intervention” than 
he is with the issues Paris raised. According to Thakur 
(2015), any backlash against R2P due to the doctrine 
being viewed in the ways Paris describes “will come 
more from the use of the language of humanitarian in-
tervention than from mixed motives” (p. 17). Thakur’s 
response to Paris further demonstrates a preoccupa-
tion with discourse. Contrary to Thakur’s claim, it is 
how R2P interventions unfold in practice rather than 
the language that is used to discuss the interventions 
that will determine whether R2P is viewed as “humani-
tarian intervention” in new clothing. 
3. R2P and Libya at the Security Council 
On February 25, 2011, ten days after the first anti-
Qaddafi protests were held, the United Nations Securi-
ty Council met to discuss the situation in Libya. Secre-
tary-General Ban Ki-moon briefed the Security Council 
on the situation in Libya, claiming that reports indicat-
ed that more than 1,000 people had already been 
killed by violence and indiscriminate use of force (Unit-
ed Nations, Security Council [UNSC], 2011a). Ki-moon 
would go on to note that accounts provided by the 
press, human rights groups, and civilians included alle-
gations of indiscriminate force, arbitrary arrests, tar-
geting of peaceful protesters, detention and torture of 
members of the opposition, and the use of foreign 
fighters. After making these allegations, Ki-moon added 
that he lacked “conclusive proof, but the reports appear 
to be credible and consistent” (UNSC, 2011a, p. 3). 
The next day, the United Kingdom introduced Reso-
lution 1970. Unanimously adopted, Resolution 1970 re-
ferred to “widespread and systematic attacks…against 
the civilian population” and reminded Libya of its “re-
sponsibility to protect its population” (UNSC, 2011c, 
p.1). The resolution imposed an arms embargo, banned 
Libyan officials from traveling, froze officials’ assets, 
and referred the situation to the International Criminal 
Court (ICC). Following the resolution’s adoption, France 
stated, “The text unanimously adopted today, recalls 
the responsibility of each State to protect its own 
population and of the international community to inter-
vene when States fail in their duty” (UNSC, 2011b, p. 5). 
Unanimous support for Resolution 1970 included 
affirmative votes from China and Russia—two coun-
tries traditionally opposed to interference in the inter-
nal affairs of sovereign states. A key factor in their sup-
port was the demands of regional stakeholders, such as 
the Arab League, African Union, and Organization of 
the Islamic Conference, for a cessation to the hostilities 
in Libya (Chang, 2014). Also, though the resolution re-
ferred the situation to the ICC, it did not include lan-
guage that could have been interpreted as authorizing 
the use of force against Libya. Russia made sure to em-
phasize this point. In a likely reference to the United 
States using Saddam Hussein’s failure to abide by Secu-
rity Council resolutions to justify the invasion of Iraq in 
2003, Russia argued that “it does not enjoin sanctions, 
even indirect, for forceful interference in Libya’s af-
fairs” (UNSC, 2011b, p. 4). Finally, both Chinese and 
Russian citizens living in Libya were at potential risk. 
Therefore, it was in their interest to ensure their safe 
evacuation from Libya (Chang, 2014).  
Following the Security Council’s adoption of Resolu-
tion 1970, rather than a cessation in hostilities, the 
next three weeks saw an escalation in the violence be-
tween Qaddafi’s security forces and the armed opposi-
tion. The rebels made significant territorial gains, be-
ginning in eastern Libya, then moving to the central 
coast, and then farther west. By March 5, the rebels 
controlled about half of Libya’s populated areas. The 
rebels’ success did not last long. A little more than a 
week later, Qaddafi’s forces had retaken nearly every 
area held by the rebels other than their primary 
stronghold of Benghazi (Kuperman, 2013b).  
Qaddafi’s forces had taken up positions in prepara-
tion to move on Benghazi when the Security Council 
next met to discuss the situation in Libya on March 17. 
France introduced a draft resolution prepared in con-
junction with the United States and United Kingdom. In 
support of the draft resolution, France stated, “We do 
not have much time left. It is a matter of days, perhaps 
even hours….Every hour and day that goes by increases 
the burden of responsibility on our shoulders” (UNSC, 
2011e, p. 3). Following France’s remarks, Resolution 
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1973 was adopted with ten votes for, none against, 
and five abstentions. Resolution 1973 authorized 
Member States “through regional organizations or ar-
rangements…to take all necessary measures…to protect 
civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of at-
tack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya” (UNSC, 2011d, p. 3). 
Four of the five BRICS countries—Brazil, Russia, In-
dia and China—were joined by NATO member Germa-
ny in abstaining. Presciently, each of the five abstaining 
countries raised issues particularly relevant to the role 
ulterior motives would ultimately play in the NATO-led 
intervention. For example, Brazil recognized the 
League of Arab States’ support for the implementation 
of a no-fly zone, but argued, “It is our view that the 
text of resolution 1973 (2011) contemplates measures 
that go far beyond that call” (UNSC, 2011e, p. 6). Ger-
many was primarily concerned that military interven-
tion would cause more harm than good. “If the steps 
proposed turn out to be ineffective,” Germany wor-
ried, “we see the danger of being drawn into a pro-
tracted military conflict that would affect the wider re-
gion. We should not enter into a militarily 
confrontation on the optimistic assumption that quick 
results with few casualties will be achieved” (UNSC, 
2011e, p. 5). 
China and Russia expressed frustration that ques-
tions they asked went unanswered prior to the vote on 
Resolution 1973 (UNSC, 2011e). Russia criticized some 
members of the Security Council for failing to address 
how the no-fly zone would be enforced, what the rules 
of engagement would be, and whether there would be 
specific limits on the use of force. Like Brazil, Russia 
was not convinced that implementation of Resolution 
1973 would be limited exclusively to civilian protection, 
noting that provisions were added to the resolution 
that exceeded the initial concept sought by the League 
of Arab States. Russia warned that the “inevitable hu-
manitarian consequences of the excessive use of out-
side force in Libya will fall fair and square on the shoul-
ders of those who might undertake such action” 
(UNSC, 2011e, p. 8).  
India called into question the objectivity of the in-
formation the Security Council had received prior to 
being asked to vote on Resolution 1973, stating that 
the resolution authorized “far-reaching measures un-
der Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, with rel-
atively little credible information on the situation on 
the ground in Libya” (p. 6). India’s criticism is significant 
because there were alternative narratives to that 
which was propagated at the Security Council. Accord-
ing to the narrative that justified adoption of Resolu-
tions 1970 and 1973, Qaddafi targeted peaceful pro-
testers with lethal force. However, some protesters in 
Libya had taken up and used arms from the first day of 
the uprising on February 15, 2011 (Kuperman, 2013a). 
Many more began using violent means in their opposi-
tion to Qaddafi soon thereafter (O’Connell, 2011).  
The urban environment in which the fighting was 
taking place was a contributing factor in the deaths of 
civilians during the conflict’s early stages. Human 
Rights Watch reported that in the first seven weeks of 
intense fighting in Misurata, a total of 949 people were 
wounded. Of the 949 wounded, 22 were women and 
eight were children (Kuperman, 2013a). Kuperman 
concludes, “If government forces had targeted civilian 
areas indiscriminately, as alleged, the female percent-
age of wounded should have approached 50 percent, 
rather than 3 percent” (p. 111). A standard of fifty per-
cent is arguably a high burden to meet to demonstrate 
indiscriminate use of force, but three percent clearly 
fails to substantiate such claims. Kuperman (2011) 
acknowledges that Qaddafi’s forces killed hundreds of 
people while retaking control of cities from the rebels, 
and likely exceeded the laws of war while doing so; 
however, comparisons of Qaddafi’s actions to those of 
genocidal regimes were simply unfounded.  
Challenges to the narrative that justified the NATO-
led intervention were not limited to academic circles. 
On March 21, only four days after Resolution 1973 was 
passed, The New York Times reported that “the rebels 
feel no loyalty to the truth in shaping their propagan-
da…making vastly inflated claims of his [Qaddafi’s] bar-
baric behavior” (Kirkpatrick, 2011). Disregard for alter-
native narratives does not necessarily mean that some 
of NATO’s members intentionally fabricated their 
claims. Rather, it emphasizes the problems associated 
with the ulterior motive exemption. NATO’s ulterior 
motives would not allow it to consider alternative nar-
ratives, because to do so could have undermined their 
justification for the use of force in Libya, which would 
have impeded them from achieving their self-
interested objective of regime change.  
Each of the five abstaining countries raised con-
cerns that could have warranted voting against Resolu-
tion 1973. This begs the question: why did they choose 
to abstain? A common explanation for the abstentions 
was the Arab League’s support for the imposition of a 
no-fly zone. The abstaining countries chose not to vote 
against the wishes of the regional stakeholders. It is al-
so likely that the lack of certainty regarding what might 
have happened in Benghazi had Resolution 1973 failed 
to pass played a significant role in their votes. For Rus-
sia and China, “no” votes are equivalent to a veto. Had 
Russia and China vetoed the resolution, there would 
not have been an intervention, at least not in the same 
timeframe. If the failure to intervene resulted in a mas-
sacre at Benghazi, as was claimed to be inevitable, 
there would have been serious political ramifications. 
Brazil, India, and Germany would have shared these 
ramifications had they also voted against the resolu-
tion. To put it simply, it was easier and less risky to ab-
stain from voting than it would have been to vote 
against the resolution. For Germany, abstaining also 
provided the added benefit of not voting against its fel-
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low NATO members’ resolution while publicly stating 
that it would not be contributing any of its own forces 
to the military effort.  
4. NATO’s Primary Intent: From Civilian Protection to 
Regime Change 
The NATO-led bombing campaign began within hours 
of the adoption of Resolution 1973, and only one 
month after Libya’s civil war had begun. Pattison 
(2011) argues that, at least initially, the predominant 
intention behind NATO’s intervention was civilian pro-
tection. Yet, even in the early stages of the interven-
tion “regime change did appear to be an intention, but 
only a secondary one” (Pattison, 2011, p. 273). Other 
R2P proponents are less willing than Pattison to recog-
nize that NATO’s ulterior motive of regime change 
evolved into regime change being one of its intentions. 
For example, Weiss (2011a) is dismissive of the idea 
that NATO may have had other intentions behind the 
intervention, stating, “The anguished hue and cry 
about R2P being a ruse for Western Imperialism is dis-
ingenuous but resonant in parts of the global South” 
(p. 289). Further, according to Weiss (2011a), “The in-
ternational action against Libya was not about bomb-
ing for…regime change…or pursuing narrow interests. 
These may result from such action, but the dominant 
motivation for using military force was to protect civil-
ians” (p. 291).  
Where regime change fits among NATO’s early set 
of priorities is open to debate; however, that NATO 
was intent on regime change in Libya is not. In a March 
3 statement, two weeks before Resolution 1973 was 
adopted, President Obama stated, “Muammar Gaddafi 
has lost legitimacy to lead, and he must leave” (Cala-
bresi, 2011). On March 21, 2011, only days after 
NATO’s bombing campaign had begun, Obama stated 
that it was “U.S. policy that Qaddafi needs to go. But 
when it comes to our military action, we are doing so in 
support of U.N. Security Resolution 1973…and we are 
going to make sure we stick to that mandate” (Condon, 
2011). Similarly, in an April 14 letter signed by Obama, 
Prime Minister Cameron, and President Sarkozy, it 
states, “Our duty and our mandate under UN Security 
Council Resolution 1973 is to protect civilians, and we 
are doing that. It is not to remove Gaddafi by force. But 
it is impossible to imagine a future for Libya with Gad-
dafi in power” (Stratton, 2011). 
NATO members tried to have it both ways; they re-
peatedly proclaimed that Qaddafi needed to go while 
also claiming that they would stick to the mandate de-
fined by Resolution 1973. Despite their efforts, NATO’s 
actions belie their rhetorical reassurances. NATO went 
beyond anything that could reasonably be interpreted 
to have been authorized (O’Connell, 2011). According 
to its own numbers, NATO launched 9,700 strike sor-
ties, destroying 5,900 military targets during its seven 
month campaign (Amnesty International, 2012b). If 
NATO had intended to provide civilian protection as it 
was authorized to do, it would have limited its actions 
to administering a no-fly zone and bombing forces—
including rebel forces—that were threatening civilians. 
Instead, the “intervention quickly exceeded the UN 
mandate of civilian protection by bombing Libyan forc-
es in retreat or based in bastions of Khadafy support, 
such as Sirte, where they threatened no civilians” (Ku-
perman, 2011). 
NATO also repeatedly stood in opposition to forging 
a ceasefire between the Qaddafi regime and the re-
bels. Hours before NATO began its bombing campaign, 
Qaddafi proposed a ceasefire between his forces and 
the rebels that was rejected (Bumiller & Kirkpatrick, 
2011). On April 10, NATO rejected a second ceasefire 
offer, one that was developed by the African Union, 
and was fully consistent with what was called for by 
Resolution 1973. The proposal, endorsed by Qaddafi, 
included a ceasefire, the creation of corridors for the 
delivery of humanitarian aid, and a dialogue to open 
discussions on reforming Libya’s political system (Par-
ker & Daragahi, 2011). Again, on April 29, NATO reject-
ed a proposed ceasefire based on the African Union 
roadmap (Noueihed, 2011). 
NATO’s response to the ceasefire proposals is not 
consistent with a humanitarian intent. If NATO’s inten-
tion was humanitarian, ceasefire offers would have 
been taken as opportunities to alleviate human suffer-
ing across Libya. Instead, NATO openly supported the 
rebels and repeatedly rejected ceasefire proposals. As 
Kuperman (2013b) notes, “This significantly extended 
the war, magnifying the harm to civilians, contrary to 
the intent of the UN authorization” (p. 197).  
Evans and Thakur (2013) are critical of NATO for 
some of the same reasons noted above. Yet, rather 
than connect NATO’s actions to R2P’s ulterior motive 
exemption, they essentially treat NATO’s actions as 
unbecoming of states who claim to be operating under 
R2P, stating that they are not sure “that the NATO-led 
operation in Libya remained a textbook R2P case for its 
duration” (p. 206). Going beyond what is authorized is 
a symptom of the ulterior motive exemption and its as-
sociated influence over the intervener’s intentions. If 
the motive for participation in a military intervention is 
something other than civilian protection, the interven-
ers will not limit their actions to the protection of the 
civilian population. In fact, if the reason for their partic-
ipation is the pursuance of some self-interested objec-
tive, there is no incentive for the interveners to limit 
their actions to those authorized. Rather, their partici-
pation in the intervention actually incentivizes the in-
terveners to go beyond that which was authorized. This 
is simple logic. If ulterior motives are the driving force 
behind the decision to participate in a military inter-
vention, then those motives must be pursued to make 
participation worthwhile. 
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5. From Authorized Intervention to the Crime of 
Aggression 
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter prohibits 
“threat or use of force against the territorial integrity 
or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations.” There are only two exceptions to the prohibi-
tion of the use of force: (1) the use of force authorized 
by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the United 
Nations Charter, and (2) the use of force in self-defense 
under Article 51 of the Charter. The NATO-led interven-
tion began as a lawful use of force because the Security 
Council authorized it with the adoption of Resolution 
1973. However, the force that may be used under Se-
curity Council authorization is limited to that which is 
mandated.  
It was noted previously that Resolution 1973 author-
ized Member States “through regional organizations or 
arrangements…to take all necessary measures…to pro-
tect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat 
of attack” (UNSC, 2011d, p. 3). Resolution 1973 also 
demanded the establishment of a ceasefire and rein-
forced the arms embargo previously established by 
Resolution 1970. Further, Resolution 1973 reaffirmed 
Libya’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial in-
tegrity.  
It is clear that the NATO-led intervention exceeded 
its mandate in violation of its legal obligation to limit its 
actions to those that were authorized. First and fore-
most, NATO participated on the side of the rebels in 
their civil war with the Qaddafi regime. Not only did 
NATO support the rebels in their efforts, NATO was re-
sponsible for direct attacks against Qaddafi’s forces 
who did not pose a threat to civilians. Qaddafi, no mat-
ter how reviled by some, maintained the legal right as 
Libya’s head of state to defend Libya from an armed in-
ternal threat. Any actions taken by NATO that went be-
yond that which was mandated constitute acts of ag-
gression. Related, the NATO-led intervention was 
operating under a mandate that required that all civil-
ians and civilian-populated areas be protected. By tak-
ing sides in the civil war, NATO put civilians in areas 
loyal to Qaddafi, especially in Tripoli, at greater risk as 
the rebels and NATO made their advances. Civilian 
supporters of Qaddafi not only deserved the same level 
of protection as the civilian supporters of the armed 
rebels, but their protection was also required under 
Resolution 1973. 
NATO joined the rebels in rejecting multiple cease-
fires offered by Qaddafi despite Resolution 1973 de-
manding the immediate establishment of one. Wheth-
er Qaddafi’s offers were to be trusted is debatable, but 
the offers were consistent with Resolution 1973. Yet, 
NATO rejected the offers outright in violation of the 
spirit of their mandate. Additionally, some NATO 
members participating in the intervention provided 
arms to the rebels in violation of Resolutions 1970 and 
1973. Evans and Thakur (2013) ask a series of im-
portant questions in this regard:  
If the objective genuinely was, and remained 
throughout, “the protection of civilians and civilian 
populated areas” and not regime change as such, 
why—at least after the initial defense of Benghazi—
were ceasefire offers that may have been serious 
rejected outright without exploration? Why were 
fleeing personnel posing no immediate risk to civil-
ians, and locations of no obvious military signifi-
cance, targeted? Why did the interveners break 
their own arms embargo in supplying the rebels? 
(p. 206).  
Again, Evans and Thakur (2013) view NATO’s behavior 
as evidence that at some point during the intervention 
it strayed from its commitment to R2P’s principles, ra-
ther than NATO’s behavior being directly connected to 
R2P’s ulterior motive exemption.  
Criticism of NATO for exceeding its mandate has 
generally been understated. It is not simply the case 
that NATO marginally exceeded its mandate. The NATO 
powers that led the intervention actively opposed al-
ternative resolutions to Libya’s civil war so that it could 
achieve its objective of regime change. NATO’s actions 
demonstrate that it never intended to limit its actions 
to those authorized. The provision of weapons to the 
rebels in violation of Resolution 1973 is a clear and un-
equivocal violation of international law. More egre-
giously, NATO’s participation in a civil war on the side 
of the rebels constitutes an act of aggression, crossing 
the line that separates the lawful and unlawful use of 
force. NATO’s attempt at a defense of its actions in-
cluded the claim that in order to fulfill its mandate to 
protect civilians, it was necessary to overthrow the 
Qaddafi regime (Evans & Thakur, 2013). In other 
words, NATO claimed it needed to exceed its mandate 
in order to carry out its mandate. Based on the evi-
dence, such a defense is unconvincing.  
6. NATO’s Complicity in Crimes Committed by the 
Rebels 
One week into NATO’s intervention, it was reported 
that the rebels had been perpetrating the same viola-
tions of human rights that they accused Qaddafi of 
(Zucchino, 2011). In June 2011, about half-way through 
the civil war, the International Commission of Inquiry 
on Libya submitted its provincial report. The Commis-
sion concluded that both Qaddafi’s security forces and 
the rebels had committed war crimes. Despite knowing 
early on that the rebels had allegedly committed acts 
that constituted war crimes, NATO continued to pro-
vide the rebels with offensive military support in Lib-
ya’s civil war.  
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The full extent of the crimes committed by the re-
bels was documented in the International Commission 
of Inquiry on Libya’s March 2012 report to the Human 
Rights Council. The Commission (2012) concluded that 
the rebels “committed serious violations, including war 
crimes and breaches of human rights law, the latter 
continuing at the time of the present report” (p. 2). Spe-
cifically, during the civil war, the Commission found that 
the rebels committed “acts of extrajudicial executions of 
those perceived to be loyalists, suspected mercenaries 
and captured Qadhafi soldiers, particularly when towns 
first came under control of thuwar (anti-Qaddafi forces)” 
(p. 197). Further, the Commission stated that allegations 
of violations of international humanitarian law and hu-
man rights law were not being treated equally. The 
Commission (2012) concluded, “Failure to apply criminal 
law to crimes committed by thuwar during and after the 
end of the conflict creates an environment of impunity 
and leaves the victims of thuwar violations without pro-
tection of the law, justice and redress” (p. 195).  
As Prashad (2012) notes, “NATO’s partisan bom-
bardment allowed the rebels to seize the country fast-
er than they might have had in a more protracted war, 
but it also allowed them carte blanche to continue with 
their own crimes against humanity.” Because NATO 
was openly supporting the rebels, it was clear the re-
bels would be able to commit their crimes with impuni-
ty. This sentiment was echoed in the Commission’s re-
port, which stated that the Commissioners were 
“deeply concerned that no independent investigation 
or prosecution appear to have been instigated into kill-
ings committed by thuwar” (Independent Commission 
of Inquiry on Libya, 2012).  
Because of NATO’s military support for the rebels, it 
shares responsibility for how the rebels conducted 
themselves during and after the civil war. NATO was 
aware that the rebels were committing crimes, even 
going so far as to warn the rebels against committing 
crimes against civilians less than two weeks into the in-
tervention (Bumiller & Kirkpatrick, 2011). Further, the 
International Commission of Inquiry on Libya stated 
explicitly in June 2011 that the rebels had committed 
war crimes. If NATO’s primary intent was civilian pro-
tection, why did some of its members arm the rebels 
and continue to participate in a civil war in support of 
rebels that were committing war crimes? In doing so, 
NATO is complicit in the rebels’ crimes.  
7. Civilian Casualties from NATO Airstrikes 
As noted previously, NATO launched 9,700 strike sor-
ties, destroying 5,900 military targets during its seven 
month campaign (Amnesty International, 2012b). In 
November 2011, NATO claimed, “We have carried out 
this operation very carefully, without confirmed civilian 
casualties” (Chivers & Schmitt, 2011). Kristele Younes, 
director of field operations for Civic, noted a serious 
contradiction in NATO’s position regarding civilian cas-
ualties. Younes states that NATO created its own defi-
nition of what constitutes a “confirmed” civilian death 
from NATO airstrikes—only those confirmed by a NATO 
investigation. Yet, NATO also refused to investigate al-
legations. Therefore, by NATO’s logic, it could claim 
that there were zero civilian casualties. Younes stated, 
“The position was absurd. But they made it very clear: 
there was no appetite within NATO to look at these in-
cidents” (Chivers & Schmitt, 2011).  
In late 2011 and early 2012, The New York Times, 
Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch con-
ducted investigations into NATO airstrikes. The New 
York Times found “credible accounts of dozens of civil-
ians killed by NATO in many distinct attacks. The vic-
tims, including at least 29 women or children, often 
had been asleep in homes when the ordinance hit” 
(Chivers & Schmitt, 2011). Amnesty International 
(2012b) was able to document at least 55 civilian casu-
alties from NATO airstrikes, including 16 children and 
14 women. Many of the deaths were the result of 
NATO airstrikes on private homes in urban and rural 
areas of Libya. Following its investigation, Amnesty In-
ternational (2012b) concluded that NATO “made signif-
icant efforts to minimize the risk of causing civilian cas-
ualties….However, scores of Libyan civilians who did 
not directly participate in hostilities were killed and 
many more injured as a result of NATO strikes” (pp. 5-
6). Human Rights Watch (2012b) came to similar find-
ings in its investigation, acknowledging that the overall 
loss of civilian life in NATO airstrikes appears to 
demonstrate that precautions were generally taken. 
However, “NATO air strikes killed at least 72 civilians, 
one-third of them children under age 18” (Human 
Rights Watch, 2012b, p. 4). 
The International Commission of Inquiry on Libya 
found that NATO successfully avoided killing large 
numbers of civilians in its airstrikes. However, the 
Commission (2012) confirmed civilian casualties and 
“found targets that showed no evidence of military 
utility” (p. 2). The Commission (2012) stated that it was 
unable to draw conclusions regarding these incidents 
based on “the information provided by NATO” (p. 2). 
The Commission called upon NATO to complete an in-
vestigation to fill the information gap. Amnesty Inter-
national (2012b) and Human Rights Watch (2012b) 
have called for the same. Amnesty International 
(2012b) called on NATO “to take all necessary 
measures to ensure that independent, impartial and 
thorough investigations are conducted without further 
delay, that the findings be publicly disclosed, and that 
adequate reparation be afforded to all victims of any 
violations and their families” (p. 18). In its response, 
NATO expressed regret that civilians were harmed in 
its airstrikes, but deflected Amnesty International’s call 
for investigations, claiming that NATO “has no mandate 
to conduct any activities in Libya following OUP’s (Op-
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eration United Protector) termination on 31 October 
2011” (Amnesty International, 2012b, p. 18).  
International law requires that suspected violations 
of international humanitarian law be investigated by 
the state responsible for the acts in question. Further, 
when appropriate, those responsible for the violations 
must be punished and the families of those who were 
victimized must be compensated. Following NATO’s in-
tervention, Russia repeatedly asked for an impartial in-
vestigation into the means NATO used during its inter-
vention in Libya. In a statement expressing the United 
States’ refusal to allow such an investigation, Ambas-
sador Rice stated, 
This is a distraction and a diversion…from the fact 
that this Council’s actions, and that of NATO and its 
partners, saved tens of thousands, if not hundreds 
of thousands, of Libyan lives….And if the Libyans 
want to work with NATO to investigate any con-
cerns they have, we’re more than willing to do that. 
I think it’s notable that we have not heard that call 
from the Libyan government (Goodman, 2012). 
The U.S. response to Russia’s call for investigations is 
problematic for two reasons. First, even if Rice’s claims 
were true, civilian casualties from NATO airstrikes 
would still be relevant and would still require investiga-
tion under international humanitarian law. Second, 
Rice implies that NATO was innocent of any potential 
wrongdoing because the new Libyan government had 
not called upon NATO to investigate civilian casualties 
from its airstrikes. However, the rebels had no incen-
tive to call for investigations, because NATO made it 
possible for them to take power and because the re-
bels had committed crimes of their own.  
NATO’s refusal to investigate civilian deaths caused 
by its airstrikes further calls into question the inten-
tions behind its actions in Libya. The refusal demon-
strates a lack of honesty, remorse, and willingness to 
accept responsibility. These are not the characteristics 
of an intervener committed to civilian protection; they 
are the characteristics of an intervener bent on achiev-
ing the objectives that motivated its involvement in the 
conflict in the first place. Prashad asks a series of perti-
nent questions: “The real question is, why won’t NATO 
allow an evaluation of the Libyan war? What if we dis-
cover that the number of civilian casualties, the bomb-
ing in places like Marjah, the bombing in places in the 
center of Tripoli, had indeed cost the lives of a very 
large number of civilians? What is the harm of NATO 
coming under an evaluation?” (Goodman, 2012). Al-
lowing such an evaluation, according to Prashad, would 
demonstrate “the actual commitment to human rights 
and to responsibility to protect civilians that the United 
States purports to support” (Goodman, 2012). Yet, ra-
ther than do so, NATO members have continued to 
shield themselves from any accountability. 
8. NATO’s Shared Responsibility for Rebel Crimes 
Committed Post-Intervention 
Thanks to NATO’s support, the rebels ultimately suc-
ceeded in overthrowing Qaddafi. NATO’s lack of con-
cern for the crimes committed by the rebels during the 
civil war continued unabated following the war’s con-
clusion and the summary execution of Qaddafi, itself a 
war crime. In fact, far from concerned that Qaddafi had 
been executed, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and 
Prime Minister David Cameron made light of it. When 
informed of Qaddafi’s death, Clinton joked, “We came, 
we saw, he died” (Daly, 2011). Meanwhile Cameron, in 
a speech celebrating the Hindu festival of Diwali, said, 
“Obviously, Diwali being the festival of good over evil, 
and also celebrating the death of a devil, perhaps 
there’s a little resonance in what I’m saying tonight” 
(Media Lens, 2011).  
While celebrating the death of Qaddafi, the same 
NATO powers that had facilitated the rebels’ success 
turned their backs on Libya. Post-intervention Libya 
was consumed by rampant lawlessness. Some of the 
most horrific human rights violations were perpetrated 
by the rebels against both real and perceived Qaddafi 
loyalists. Four days after Qaddafi was killed, Human 
Rights Watch documented the execution of Qaddafi 
supporters in Sirte. According to Peter Bouckaert, “We 
found 53 decomposing bodies, apparently Gaddafi 
supporters, at an abandoned hotel in Sirte, and some 
had their hands bound behind their backs when they 
were shot” (Human Rights Watch, 2011a). These exe-
cutions were part of what Daniel Williams (2011) de-
scribes as “a vast revenge killing spree.” According to 
Williams (2011), “Members of these militias have en-
gaged in torture, pursued suspected enemies far and 
wide, detained them and shot them in detention.” Exe-
cution of individuals who have been detained is a war 
crime. 
The town of Tawergha was cleansed of its 30,000 
inhabitants by the rebels. Tawergha had been populat-
ed mainly by citizens loyal to Qaddafi. On October 30, 
2011, Human Rights Watch (2011b) reported that even 
after cleansing the town, the rebels continued to ter-
rorize those who had been displaced. Human Rights 
Watch (2011b) received “credible accounts of some 
Misrata militias shooting unarmed Tawerghans, and of 
arbitrary arrests and beatings of Tawerghan detainees, 
in a few cases leading to death.” Tawerghans who were 
interviewed by the International Commission of Inquiry 
on Libya (2012) described being tortured and forced to 
confess to crimes they did not commit. The Commis-
sion concluded that the attacks against Tawerghans 
constituted war crimes when committed during the civ-
il war and crimes against humanity subsequent to it. 
In January 2012, three months after Qaddafi had 
been executed, Doctors Without Borders (MSF) an-
nounced that it was no longer able to provide medical 
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treatment at detention centers in Libya because its 
staff were being delivered patients who showed clear 
signs of torture. These patients had undergone interro-
gation sessions involving torture carried out by the re-
bels. “Patients were brought to us in the middle of in-
terrogation for medical care, in order to make them fit 
for more interrogation,” MSF General Director Christo-
pher Stokes said in a statement. “This is unacceptable. 
Our role is to provide medical care to war casualties 
and sick detainees, not to repeatedly treat the same 
patients between torture sessions” (Doctors Without 
Borders, 2012). On February 16, 2012, Amnesty Inter-
national (2012a) reported on attacks carried out by re-
bels against African migrants, forcibly displacing entire 
communities. A few days later, Human Rights Watch 
reported that villages that were home to Qaddafi sup-
porters were being razed and that those who were dis-
placed were being refused access to their homes (Hu-
man Rights Watch, 2012a). 
In its March 2012 report, the International Commis-
sion of Inquiry on Libya (2012) provides a thorough 
summary of the crimes committed by the rebels sub-
sequent to the end of Libya’s civil war:  
Torture and other forms of ill-treatment are preva-
lent in detention centres, and at least a dozen indi-
viduals died as a result of torture at the hands of 
thuwar. The thuwar have also carried out revenge 
attacks against targeted communities perceived as 
loyalist. The Commission found acts of extrajudicial 
killings, torture, enforced disappearance, indiscrim-
inate attacks, and pillage. Tens of thousands are 
prevented from returning home. No investigations 
have been carried out into any violations commit-
ted by the thuwar (p. 197).  
The former rebels are responsible for some of the most 
egregious human rights violations imaginable. Without 
NATO’s support, it is unlikely that the rebels would 
have been in the position to commit the acts detailed 
above. NATO’s refusal to investigate its own actions 
and its continued support for the rebels while they 
were committing war crimes during the civil war con-
tributed to a culture of impunity in Libya. The lack of 
accountability represents a clear case of victors’ justice.  
9. Filling the Accountability Vacuum? 
In November 2011, Brazil introduced the concept of 
“responsibility while protecting” (RWP) as part of an ef-
fort to ensure that the use of force for humanitarian 
purposes produces as little violence and instability as 
possible (UNSC, 2011f). The main idea behind RWP is 
that through committing itself to holding intervening 
states accountable for exceeding that which is author-
ized, the Security Council can better ensure the protec-
tion of civilian populations. In support of its proposal, 
Brazil stated, “In the event that the use of force is con-
templated, action must be judicious, proportionate and 
limited to the objectives established by the Security 
Council. Enhanced Council procedures are needed to 
monitor and assess the manner in which resolutions 
are interpreted and implemented to ensure responsi-
bility while protecting” (p. 17). 
Though well-intended, Brazil’s proposal is ultimate-
ly short-sighted. Even if institutionalized, RWP cannot 
overcome the ulterior motives problem or the ac-
countability vacuum, which is unfortunate because ac-
countability could be one of the only means to mini-
mizing the ulterior motive problem. Regarding the 
former, Xenia Avezov (2013) argues, “While it is politi-
cally incorrect to say so, intervention is often guided by 
a calculation of economic, political, and human costs to 
the intervener. Neither R2P nor RWP realistically ad-
dress these costs of intervention and how they influ-
ence the decision to intervene.” Regarding the latter, 
Brazil’s proposal presumes an international system 
made up of sovereign states that equally benefit from 
and are accountable to international law, and that the 
institutions necessary to hold Libya’s former rebels and 
their NATO benefactors accountable for their violations 
of international law are effective. The reality is that the 
ICC is plagued by its own biases and has also failed to 
garner universal recognition. This is evident in that not 
a single former rebel has been investigated, even 
though Resolution 1970 referred the situation in Libya 
to the ICC without limiting the referral to only those 
crimes committed by Gaddafi’s regime. Further, unlike 
the United States, the United Kingdom and France are 
members of the ICC, yet neither has been investigated 
for its complicity in the rebels’ crimes. Additionally, 
even if there were formal mechanisms at the Security 
Council that could assess the manner in which the 
United States, United Kingdom, and France imple-
mented Resolution 1973, any attempt at accountability 
ranging from censure to a more tangible punishment 
would be vetoed.  
10. Conclusion 
The responsibility to protect’s ulterior motive exemp-
tion permits intervention in a humanitarian crisis for 
the purpose of providing civilian protection when the 
intervener is driven to do so for reasons other than 
providing that protection. The purpose of this exemp-
tion is to promote intervention in cases in which 
providing civilian protection alone would not sufficient-
ly motivate states to act. The problem with this ap-
proach is that it assumes that the intervener is capable 
of restraining itself from taking actions that seek to 
achieve the self-interested objective that motivated its 
involvement in the first place when such actions may 
undermine the purpose of the mission.  
Evidence shows that NATO’s ulterior motive for in-
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tervening in Libya had disastrous consequences. The 
NATO-led intervention was based on a distorted narra-
tive, which was relied upon throughout the duration of 
Libya’s civil war in order to justify NATO’s continued in-
volvement, and NATO’s continued involvement was 
needed to ensure that its self-interested objective was 
achieved. While achieving its objective, NATO violated 
international law by committing an act of aggression 
against Libya in violation of the United Nations Charter; 
by killing civilians in its airstrike without completing 
publicly disclosed investigations required by interna-
tional humanitarian law; and by its complicity in crimes 
committed by the rebels due to its continued military 
support of the rebels despite being aware that the re-
bels were committing war crimes and other egregious 
human rights violations during the conflict. Additional-
ly, NATO failed to act on its responsibility to rebuild 
when it turned its back to the crimes being committed 
by the rebels after the overthrow of Qaddafi. 
The emergence of R2P was supposed to correct the 
deficiencies associated with its “humanitarian interven-
tion” predecessor. R2P has successfully shifted the dis-
course regarding when, why, and how the international 
community ought to respond to pressing humanitarian 
crises resulting from a state’s neglect or inability to 
protect its population from mass atrocity crimes, or its 
active participation in the commission of such crimes. 
However, it has not yet succeeded in bringing interven-
tionary practice in line with the discourse, and it is not 
clear currently whether doing so is even possible. Such 
criticism may seem harsh when considering R2P’s rela-
tive youth, but it should not be interpreted this way. 
R2P’s ulterior motive exemption is not the root of the 
problems identified here; the prioritization of self-
interests even when these interests are in competition 
with humanitarian objectives is the root of the prob-
lem. Surrounding R2P’s ulterior motive exemption 
with a number of principles that seek to constrain an 
intervener’s actions to those which are required for 
civilian protection cannot overcome such a great ob-
stacle; nor can the development of responsibilities 
while protecting. 
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